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A Novel Approach for Partial Fingerprint
Identification to Mitigate MasterPrint Generation
Mahesh Joshi, Bodhisatwa Mazumdar, and Somnath Dey
Abstract—Partial fingerprint recognition is a method to rec-
ognize an individual when the sensor size has a small form
factor to accept a full fingerprint. It is also used in forensic
research to identify the partial fingerprints collected from the
crime scenes. But the distinguishing features in the partial
fingerprint are relatively low due to small fingerprint captured
by the sensor. Hence, the uniqueness of a partial fingerprint
cannot be guaranteed, leading to a possibility that a single
partial fingerprint may identify multiple subjects. A MasterPrint
is a partial fingerprint that identifies at least 4% different
individuals from the enrolled template database. A fingerprint
identification system with such a flaw can play a significant
role in convicting an innocent in a criminal case. We propose a
partial fingerprint identification approach that aims to mitigate
MasterPrint generation. The proposed method, when applied to
partial fingerprint dataset cropped from standard FVC 2002
DB1(A) dataset, showed significant improvement in reducing the
count of MasterPrints. The experimental result demonstrates
improved results on other parameters, such as True match Rate
(TMR) and Equal Error Rate (EER), generally used to evaluate
the performance of a fingerprint biometric system.
Index Terms—Biometrics, Fingerprint recognition, Security,
Feature detection, Feature extraction.
I. INTRODUCTION
Fingerprint recognition system uses features extracted from
a user’s fingerprint to conclude if he is already enrolled or
not. The input to such a system can be a full fingerprint or a
small portion of the user fingerprint, i.e., a partial fingerprint.
These systems can thus act as a security mechanism for
automatic authentication and identification of an individual.
In the identification process, we assume that the user is
already enrolled, but his identity is unknown. We perform a
comparison of the user’s fingerprint with all the records stored
in the database during enrollment. The system declares the
anonymous user with the identity of the record entry having
the highest similarity score. For a biometric authentication
system, the user reveals his identity while submitting the
fingerprint called a probe fingerprint. The system, in this case,
compares the submitted fingerprint against the records of the
claimed user and declare if he’s what he claimed or he’s lying.
A typical fingerprint recognition system (an identification
or an authentication system) compares a probe fingerprint
with a fingerprint template (secured and protected format of
a biometric sample) retrieved from the database and gen-
erates a similarity score (usually a numeric value) [1]. A
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user recognition is said to be successful if the similarity
score is above the predefined threshold set for the biometric
system. Generally, the partial fingerprint recognition system
performs comparison in three possible ways. The partial probe
fingerprint can undergo comparison against another partial
fingerprint template, or a full fingerprint template generated
directly from a full fingerprint, or a full fingerprint template
created by applying image fusion technique on multiple partial
fingerprints.
A fingerprint is composed of ridges, which are the dark lines
and valley, which is the white portion between dark lines [2].
Most of the fingerprint recognition system uses minutiae, a
point where three ridges emerge, or a single ridge ends, as
the basis for recognising an individual. The global features
in a fingerprint include core, delta, singular points, etc. [3].
The local features such as ridge properties, nearest neighbours
to a minutia, etc., along with the global features, play a
significant role in improving the recognition accuracy of the
biometric system. Due to the comparatively small dimension
of a partial fingerprint, the number of minutiae extracted from
it is less. So the probability of observing global features in
every partial fingerprint is very low. Hence, we can find various
approaches for partial fingerprint recognition in the literature,
which mainly rely on extraction of minutiae and different
combinations of local features.
The MasterPrint vulnerability associated with partial fin-
gerprint identification system addressed in this paper may
generate a source to mount a wolf attack. A wolf attack is
a kind of presentation attack wherein a partial fingerprint acts
like a wolf and identifies multiple users from the database,
as shown in Fig. 1. The MasterPrints generated from partial
fingerprints may be misused to convict an innocent in a
criminal offence. The adversary can use a similar MasterPrint
to break the biometric home security application or to perform
an illegal transaction at the bank or money dispenser machine.
II. THE MASTERPRINT VULNERABILITY
A single (full and partial) fingerprint is generally enrolled
several times to improve the accuracy of the fingerprint
biometric system. We collect multiple samples of the same
full fingerprint, but for recognising a partial fingerprint, the
system may require more than ten partial fingerprints of
the same enrolled full fingerprint. The fingerprint biometric
identification system responds with a positive match if the
partial probe fingerprint generates a similarity score higher
than the threshold for any of the enrolled partial fingerprints.
This scenario can lead to a situation where multiple partial
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Fig. 1. The MasterPrint scenario (assume there are 100 subjects enrolled,
namely, U1, U2, . . . , U100
fingerprints from different users pass the comparison test. Roy
et al. [4] investigated this vulnerability for partial fingerprint
identification system and claimed to be able to generate
MasterPrints. A MasterPrint is a partial fingerprint that can
identify more than 4% different users from the database. Fig.
1 demonstrates an example of MasterPrint scenario. A probe
partial fingerprint belonging to user U1 is expected to identify
himself. But it produces a similarity score above threshold for
partial templates for user U2, U3, U4, and U5 and thus becomes
a MasterPrint.
The authors conducted the experiments on a 150 x 150
pixel partial fingerprint dataset cropped from full fingerprint
FVC 2002 DB1 - an optical dataset. The FingerPass DB7
capacitive dataset comprises partial fingerprints of size 144
x 144 pixels [5]. A partial fingerprint was considered for
the comparison if it contains at least ten minutiae. Among
them, MasterPrints were those partial fingerprints which were
able to identify 4% or more other subjects. A commercial
fingerprint identification software VeriFinger 6.1 SDK was
used to generate MasterPrints. The number of partial fin-
gerprints enrolled during the experiment was 8220, and the
results produced 1203 MasterPrints from an optical dataset.
The authors demonstrated that an adversary can use these
MasterPrints to mount a dictionary attack. The experimental
results conclude that a dictionary of top five MasterPrints was
able to identify 26.46% of users from the capacitive dataset
and 65.2% users from the optical dataset. Since the optical
dataset is cropped from the existing full fingerprint dataset
(with the constraint of 50% overlap) while the capacitive
dataset is already partial, the percentage of users identified
with top five MasterPrints from the optical dataset is high
compared to the capacitive dataset.
The multiple impressions of the same finger may vary due to
pressure applied while touching the sensor, finger orientation,
moisture around the sensing device, and sweating on the
finger. Moreover, digital image processing techniques such as
binarization, thinning may change the minutiae position by a
few pixels or the minutiae orientation by some degrees. So,
generally, an approximately similar feature between two fin-
gers is allowed during recognition. Allowing nearly identical
features may also increase the probability of the existence of
a MasterPrint. From the authors’ perspective, the enrolment
of the same finger several times and accepting a query finger
even if it is similar to any of the stored templates leads to
MasterPrint generation.
The development of a better partial fingerprint matcher
is suggested to address the vulnerability of MasterPrints. In
this paper, we propose a novel partial fingerprint identifica-
tion approach that primarily targets to mitigate MasterPrint
vulnerability. In our proposed method, the number of exact
feature matching between probe and gallery partial fingerprint
templates is more than the approximate matching. To the best
of our knowledge, we are the first to address the MasterPrint
vulnerability.
III. PROPOSED APPROACH
Fig. 3 shows the flowchart for the proposed approach for the
partial fingerprint identification (assuming that the enrolment
of all partial fingerprints from the dataset is already carried out
with the system). We can roughly divide the proposed method
into three steps, namely, minutiae extraction from the partial
probe (to be recognised) fingerprint, extracting features and
deciding minutiae quality, and MasterPrint identification. In
the first step, we read a partial fingerprint, perform binarization
and thinning operations, get the region-of-interest (ROI). The
following subsections discusses the further steps starting from
minutia detection in detail.
A. True minutiae detection
We used the metric Crossing Number (CN ) discussed in
[6], [7], [8], [9] to detect minutiae from the thinned partial
fingerprint image. Fig. 2 shows the eight-neighbourhood pixel
positions, (Pi, i ∈ {1, . . . , 8}), to compute the CN for the
centred pixel P . The formula in equation (1) computes the
CNp for the pixel P . As shown in Fig. 2, we identify a pixel,
P , as minutia if it’s CN is 1 or 3.
CNp = 0.5 ·
((
7∑
i=1
|Pi − Pi+1|
)
+ |P8 − P1|
)
(1)
Since we cropped the full fingerprint dataset to obtain partial
fingerprint dataset, the pixels located near the image boundary
may appear as false minutiae (as a ridge ending). Also, the
image enhancement (binarization technique) or error due to
thinning operation can introduce additional false minutiae.
Therefore it is highly imperative to get rid of such spurious
Fig. 2. Significance of Crossing Number (CN) to identify a pixel as a minutia.
A minutia is either ridge ending or ridge bifurcation.
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Fig. 3. Flowchart for the proposed approach (assuming that the enrolment of partial fingerprints is already carried out with the system)
minutiae to improve the recognition rate. We employ Kim et al.
[10] algorithm to detect and remove such false minutiae. The
algorithm performs post-processing on the detected minutiae
using ridge flow, ridge orientation, connectivity, and distance
between minutiae. The algorithm detects and eliminates five
different types of false minutiae, namely broken ridge, bridge,
short ridge, hole, and triangle.
B. Feature extraction
We detect a minutia and store it’s details as a triplet,
(x, y, θ), where x and y are the position (coordinates) of
the minutia and θ gives it’s orientation [0◦ − 359◦]. We
then compute the Euclidean distance of each minutia to
every other minutia to find it’s nearest three neighbours (by
identifying lowest three distances). For a partial fingerprint
with n minutiae (n >= 10), the Euclidean distance, di, i ∈
{1, 2, . . . , n − 1}, from a minutia mk(xk, yk) is calculated
using equation (2).
di =
√
(xk − xi)2 + (yk − yi)2, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n− 1} (2)
In the next step, we count the number of ridges crossing
over eight axes emerging from a minutia, as shown in Fig. 4.
The work of Peralta et al. [11] is used as a basis to empirically
decide the size for all eight axes surrounding a minutia as 18
pixels.
Finally, we generate a 12-element tuple corresponding to
each real minutia, M , as
M = (Mq, Rcr1 , Rcr2 , . . . , Rcr8 , d1, d2, d3)
where, Mq represents the minutia quality (computed us-
ing equation (3)) (0-bad quality, 1-good quality), Rcri , i ∈
{1, 2, . . . , 8}, is the count of ridge crossings on ith axis
emerging from the minutia, di, i ∈ {1, 2, 3} is the Euclidean
distance with the nearest three neighbours for the minutia. The
values for ridge crossings, Rcri i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 8}, in a minutia
tuple represents the count of the number of ridges crossing
over the line formed by connecting 18 pixels along the axis,
starting from the minutia coordinates. Since the generation of
similarity score requires all the entries for ridge crossing to be
matched exactly, the entry for a given Rcri , i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 8},
is marked with −1 if there is an image boundary before the
18th pixel on its ith axis.
The equation (3) represents the formula to calculate the
value for Mq. This first element in each minutiae tuple is
binary-valued and specifies the quality of a minutia. Mq = 1
Fig. 4. The black squares in the figure constitute the ridge structure of a
thinned partial fingerprint. The green sqaures represents the (18 pixel) axis
formed around each minutia (marked in red color) to count the ridge crossings,
Rcri , i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 8}, in each direction. The numbers in red colour shows
the value for ridge crossings on corresponding axis.
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represents a good quality minutia (having all values ≥ 0 for
the ridge crossings along eight axis surrounding the minutia)
which undergoes comparison with another good quality minu-
tiae. Mq = 0 represents a comparatively bad quality minutiae
tuple that will miss the comparison with other minutiae tuples.
Since the significance of Mq is to discard the minutia that lies
within the 18 pixel from the image boundary, we consider the
last eleven components of M (we exclude Mq) for computing
the similarity score.
Mq =

1 , if
(
8∑
i=1
|Rcri | −
8∑
i=1
Rcri
)
= 0
0 , otherwise
(3)
The order of the eight ridge crossing values, namely
Rcr1 , Rcr2 , . . . , Rcr8 , in each minutia tuple, M , is performed
by selection of θ (stored as initial minutia triplet) to ensure
rotation-invariant feature extraction. Table I shows the sig-
nificance of θ to decide the first count of ridge crossings,
Rcr1 , in a given minutiae tuple. The subsequent count of
ridge crossings, Rcri , i ∈ {2, 3, . . . , 8}, is measured in anti-
clockwise direction from the axis corresponding to Rcr1 .
C. Similarity score computation
Suppose the probe template having n minutiae is repre-
sented as a set, Sp, and the gallery template havingm minutiae
is represented as a set, Sg .
Sp = {Mp1 ,Mp2,Mp3, . . . ,Mpn}, and
Sg = {Mg1,Mg2,Mg3, . . . ,Mgm}
where Mpi , i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} and Mgj , j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}
represents a minutia tuple. Let P and G be the probe and
gallery minutia tuples under comparison, respectively. We say
the minutia P and G are in correspondence if the following
two conditions on Rcri , i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 8} and dj , j ∈ {1, 2, 3}
are satisfied,
1) (Rcri)P == (Rcri)G
and (Rcri)P >= 0
and (Rcri)G >= 0, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 8}
2) (dj)P − (dj)G = 0, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}
We create another set, Sm (empty initially), that holds the
set of minutiae tuples that are in correspondence.
Sm = {M1,M2,M3, . . . ,Mk}
TABLE I
RELATION BETWEEN θ AND Rcr1
Range of θ
Starting axis for computing
Rcr1
>=338◦ and <=22◦ +X axis
[23◦ - 67◦] X = Y axis
[68◦ - 112◦] +Y axis
[113◦ - 157◦] −X = Y axis
[158◦ - 202◦] −X axis
[203◦ - 247◦] −X = −Y axis
[248◦ - 292◦] −Y axis
[293◦ - 337◦] −Y = X axis
where k ≤ min(n,m) and Mi ∈ {Sp ∩ Sg}, i ∈
{1, 2, . . . , k}. The count for the minutiae in correspondence
is given by mc as
mc =
min(p,g)∑
i=1
Xi
where, Xi = 1 if there exists a pair of minutiae Mi ∈ Sp
and Mj ∈ Sg in correspondence, else Xi = 0. The proposed
similarity score, SS, is then computed as the average of the
sum of αp and αg as
ProposedSS =
αp + αg
2
(4)
where αp = mc/n and αg = mc/m.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
This section presents the details about the experimental
setup and performance analysis. The proposed approach is
a partial fingerprint identification and verification system
capable of mitigating the generation of MasterPrints. We
target unique and accurate user identification based on partial
fingerprints while mitigating MasterPrint generation.
A. Experimental setup
We cropped the partial fingerprint dataset from the standard
FVC 2002 DB1-A dataset. A desktop system with 64-bit
Ubuntu 18.04.2 LTS operating system having 64 GB internal
memory (RAM) and Intel R© Xeon(R) CPU E5-1620 v3 @
3.50 GHz × 8 processor is used for the experiment. The
proposed approach is programmed using the commercial com-
puting software MATLAB R2017a. The total number of partial
fingerprints in the cropped dataset with at least 10 minutiae is
9802, whereas 9601 partial fingerprints are having at least 10
good quality minutiae.
The average space requirement for storing a single minutia
tuple is between 40−50 bytes. Thus if there are 15 tuples on an
average in each template and a we have 12 partial fingerprints
per subject, then for 100 subjects with 8 impressions per
finger would require 5.5−7.5 MB of secondary storage space.
The probability of MasterPrint generation increase as the
number of comparisons with other partial fingerprint grows.
In our experiment, we aimed at lowering the possibility of
MasterPrint generation when the comparisons are maximum.
So instead of dividing the dataset into training (enrolled) and
testing (query) dataset, we compared each partial fingerprint
with every other partial fingerprint from the dataset, excluding
itself.
B. Results targeting MasterPrint
Fig. 5 shows the bar chart for the number of minutiae
from the dataset used in the experiments. The analysis shows
that the average minutiae per partial fingerprint are 26.6,
whereas the average good quality minutiae per template are
26.2. MasterPrint is an example of a closed-set biometric
identification problem. Suppose, NT denotes the total number
of comparisons, NC be the number of correct matches (i.e.
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when highest similarity score is generated for correct subject),
NF represents the number of false matches, and NR be the
number of rejected probe templates. The True Match Rate
(TMR), False Match Rate (FMR), and False Non-match Rate
(FNMR) for identification experiments are computed using the
formula in equation (5), (6) and (7) respectively.
TMR =
NC
NT
(5)
FMR =
NF
NT
(6)
FNMR =
NR
NT
(7)
The Verification Rate (VR) is calculated with the formula
in equation (8).
V R =
NC
NT
(8)
Suppose we have N subjects. Each subject will enrol their
J fingers, and there are K impressions for each finger. There
are L partial prints after cropping a single full fingerprint. So
we have, NG = J ·K , full prints per subject. Thus we have a
partial fingerprint dataset, F = {PF ij,k,l|i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, j ∈
{1, . . . , J}, k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, l ∈ {1, . . . , L}}.
Let Θ represents the matching threshold and S(χ,PF ij,k,l)
be the similarity score between query partial print χ and
PF ijkl. The Impostor Match Rate (IMR) is the total number
of incorrect matches computed for all candidate prints when
a partial fingerprint undergoes comparison with partial prints
from other fingers (impostor) [4].
IMR (χ) =
1
(N − 1) · L ·NG
∑
∀i,j,k,l
φ
(
χ,PF ij,k,l
)
(9)
where,
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Fig. 5. The analysis of number of minutiae from the dataset used in
experiment.
Fig. 6. Scatter plot for true match and false match using similarity computa-
tion by RSF approach. The green dots represent true match where as the red
dots denote false match.
φ
(
χ,PF ij,k,l
)
=
{
1, if S
(
χ,PF ij,k,l
)
> Θ
0, otherwise
As the experiment was targeted to generate zero Master-
Print, the highest IMR (χ) with a partial fingerprint is 0.315
x 10−3 (i.e. there exists a partial fingerprint which identifies at
most 3 different subjects, including itself) proposed similarity
computation approach. Table II shows the analysis of the
proposed approach when the target is to avoid MasterPrint
generation. The TMR achieved using proposed similarity
computation approach while zero MasterPrints are generated,
is around 60% when the False Match Rate (FMR) is 4.36% and
the FNMR is 35.27%. The TMR achieved using SS1 while
zero MasterPrints are generated, is around 61.55% when the
False Match Rate (FMR) is 4.37% and the FNMR is 34.08%.
Fig. 6 and 7 shows the scatter plot for partial fingerprint
identification having zero MasterPrint generated. The red dots
show a false match, and a green dot shows a true match. Both
the figures show that the false match has a low similarity score,
whereas the true match generated comparatively possess high
scores.
A Cumulative Matching Characteristic (CMC) curve shows
the Rank(k) performance of an identification system. The
best performing system will have the curve more inclined
towards the top-left corner of the curve. Fig. 8 shows the
Rank-10 performance of the proposed approach. The Rank-
10 performance is above 61%.
TABLE II
IDENTIFICATION PERFORMANCE TARGETED TOWARDS ZERO
MASTERPRINT GENERATION
RSF
approach
Proposed
approach
Threshold 0.0 0.044
True Match Rate (TMR) 0% 60.37%
False Match Rate (FMR) 0% 4.36%
False Non-match Rate (FNMR) 0% 35.27%
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Fig. 7. Scatter plot for true match and false match using proposed approach
for similarity computation. The green dots represent true match where as the
red dots denote false match.
Fig. 8. Cumulative Matching Characteristic (CMC) curve for identifying zero
MasterPrint
The CMC curve in Fig. 8 indicates a relatively low iden-
tification rate while mitigating MasterPrint generation. The
entries from Table II shows that the TMR is comparatively
low, and the FNMR is higher for a biometric recognition
system. The typical performance achieved by a full fingerprint
recognition system is usually higher than our results. After
analysing these results, we concluded that two factors are
affecting the identification performance of our approach. The
first one is the value for NT . We cropped a full fingerprint into
20 partial fingerprints spanning over 4 rows and 5 columns
as PFi,j , where i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} and j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. As
we have 9601 total partial fingerprints with at least 10 good
quality minutiae, the total number of comparisons done during
each experiment is (9601∗9600)/2 = 46084800. This number
is very high as compared to the number of comparisons done
on full fingerprints from the same dataset while identification,
(800 ∗ 799)/2 = 319600.
The second factor is the actual region between the adjacent
Fig. 9. The 50% overlapping scenario for two adjacent partial fingerprints
ABCD and A′B′C′D′ cropped from a full fingerprint
partial fingerprints, where the minutiae should be detected. Fig.
9 shows this scenario. In this case, ABCD and A′B′C′D′
are two adjacent partial fingerprints. The grey region is the
50% overlapping area. Since we have 18 pixel wide eight
axes around each minutia, the minutiae from ABCD and
A′B′C′D′ observed in the black portion, and their nearest
three minutiae lying in the grey region will declare a positive
response after comparison. The black part is just 20% of the
partial fingerprint area. One can argue that we have ten full
fingerprints for each subject in the dataset. Hence, we should
be able to recognise from partial fingerprints cropped from
these remaining full fingerprints. When we manually observed
the full fingerprint dataset, we found that most of the full
fingerprint images are itself a partial.
The above two points justify the comparatively low per-
formance of partial fingerprint identification with the dataset
cropped from the standard full fingerprint dataset having 50%
overlap. As there is no standard partial fingerprint dataset
available for experiments, any other full fingerprint dataset
cropped with the similar constraint will show the performance
on the lower side.
We further experimented our approach to determine the fea-
sibility of our method towards partial fingerprint identification
and verification. The observations from the result analysis are
as below.
C. Identification result analysis
The value of φ for all the results obtained for partial
fingerprint identification is 0. Fig. 10 shows the Cumulative
Matching Characteristic (CMC) curve for identifying partial
fingerprints from the dataset. The curve plots the Rank-20
performance. The Rank-20 performance for partial fingerprint
identification is 93.6% when the threshold is 0.03.
Table III shows the Equal Error Rate (ERR) performance of
the proposed approach. The value of φ for the EER is 0. The
lower the EER, the better the biometric recognition system. As
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TABLE III
EQUAL ERROR RATE PERFORMANCE
RSF
approach
Proposed
approach
Threshold 0.0 0.0555
Equal Error Rate (EER) 0 0.15
mentioned in Table III, the EER achieved through the proposed
approach is 0.15.
The Rank-1 performance for partial fingerprint identification
should be above 90%, and the EER should be closer to zero
on an excellent performing biometric system. The justification
stated above for the relatively low performance of the proposed
approach while generating zero MasterPrints is also applicable
here.
D. Verification result analysis
The partial fingerprint verification system requires the user
to reveal his identity while submitting the partial fingerprint.
The system then compares the submitted partial fingerprint
against only those stored partial fingerprint with a similar iden-
tity. The zero MasterPrint generation and partial fingerprint
identification results show that given a partial fingerprint, the
proposed approach works well to identify an individual. This
Fig. 10. Cumulative Matching Characteristic (CMC) curve for identifying
partial fingerprints from the dataset
TABLE IV
PERFORMANCE IN VERIFYING A SUBJECT WITH MORE THAN 4 AND MORE
THAN 8 PARTIAL FINGERPRINTS AT 0.01% FNMR
RSF
approach
Proposed
approach
Threshold 0.0 0.02
Percentage of probes verified with
> 4 partial fingerprints
0% 69.65%
Percentage of probes verified with
> 8 partial fingerprints
0% 39.44%
sub-section focuses on the feasibility of the proposed approach
to recognise full fingerprint from the dataset.
A partial fingerprint cropped from a full fingerprint having
50% overlap with the adjacent partial fingerprints will have at
most 4 other partial fingerprints that share it’s 50% region.
Suppose we have a partial fingerprint, p , that generates
a similarity score above threshold for n different partial
fingerprints (n > 4). There can be at most 4 out of n
partial fingerprints cropped from the same full fingerprint.
The remaining (n−4) partial fingerprints might have cropped
from some other full fingerprint belonging to the same subject.
We evaluated the proposed approach for verifying a partial
fingerprint. We aimed to find the percentage of probes verified
with more than 4 and more than 8 partial fingerprints. Table IV
shows the verification performance of the proposed approach
at Verification Rate (VR) of 99.99%.
The results from Table IV point out that a large share of
probes received verification from 4 or more partial fingerprints.
We have around 70% probes verified by at least five other
partial fingerprints when the threshold is set to 0.02. The result
from Table IV gives a green signal for the possibility of the
proposed approach to be able to verify a partial fingerprint
cropped multiple impressions of the same finger and thus
recognise a full fingerprint.
V. CONCLUSION
The MasterPrint is a vulnerability associated with partial
fingerprint identification. In this scenario, a single partial fin-
gerprint can identify at least four other distinct users enrolled
with the biometric system. This paper proposed a partial
fingerprint identification approach primarily target to mitigate
MasterPrint generation. We detected local features associated
with each minutia and performed an exact comparison for
the feature set from different partial fingerprints. The results
of various parameters show that the approach can generate
zero MasterPrint while identifying a broad set of subjects
through their partial fingerprints. The experimental results for
the identification and verification of partial fingerprints is also
remarkable.
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